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1 Introduction
Are some ‘climate friendly’ technologies preferable to others? Should policy
makers discriminate between supporting renewable energy sources such as
wind or solar power and carbon capture and storage (CCS)? Adding to the
many conceivable arguments for and against differentiation, we suggest one
more: in a world with imperfect climate policies, developing these technolo-
gies alters the incentives fossil fuel owners face differently. While cheaper
renewables cause extraction to speed up, lower costs of CCS may delay ex-
traction.
Climate change is to be expected as a result of human activity. On aggre-
gate, it will almost certainly affect the human condition adversely. Carbon
dioxide emissions from producing power are the single largest contribution
to this process. In order to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level likely to avoid the most harmful damages, emissions
need to be reduced and eventually to stop. A concentration of 450 parts per
million carbon dioxide-equivalent for example is estimated to give a 50 per
cent chance of limiting the rise in global average temperature to 2 degrees
Celsius (Solomon et al., 2007). This target temperature would leave about
half a trillion tonnes of carbon to be burned (Allen et al., 2009).1
Quitting emitting GHGs and at the same time securing sufficient energy
supplies requires the development and deployment of new, climate friendly
technologies. Two promising options are electricity generation from renew-
able sources such as wind and solar, and carbon capture and storage (CCS).
Wind and solar energy are in principle physically available at a sufficient
scale to replace fossil fuel power generation (MacKay, 2008). They are how-
ever at present not fully competitive,2 and various technological challenges
1See also Meinshausen et al. (2009). For an accessible introduction to climate science,
see Socolow and Lam (2007).
2Barrett (2009) reports that the best locations are at present competitive if a ton of
carbon dioxide is priced at about 35 US Dollars (2006 value).
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remain.3 CCS is a technology under development meant to abate carbon
dioxide emissions from large point sources by capturing them and storing
them underground.4
As using those technologies is more expensive than fossil fuel energy,
climate policies are necessary to encourage their deployment. But a com-
prehensive international agreement to limit GHG concentrations does not
exist today.5 The best one therefore can expect is a future commitment to
limit climate change. This lack of strong climate policy today gives owners
of fossil fuels a possibility to sell their exhaustible resources prior to climate
policies being implemented and climate friendly technologies being compet-
itive. Such intertemporal reallocation undermines policy objectives as more
carbon dioxide is emitted in early periods, and potentially total emissions
remain unchanged. This supply side effect has become known as the ‘green
paradox’ (Sinn, 2008).
The present paper contributes to the literature on fossil fuel supply under
imperfect climate policies by focusing on differences in prospective climate
friendly technologies. In particular, we ask how reductions in the costs of
the abatement technology CCS affect the market outcome. We contrast this
with improvements in renewable energy technology (reproducing results from
Hoel, 2008). To that end, we build an analytical model with two linked mar-
kets, one for fossil fuels and one for power. We look at two periods. In period
one, emission free technologies play no role, only conventional energy is avail-
able. However, actors know about the arrival of alternatives in the second
period. By that time, three types of energy technology are available: conven-
tional fossil energy, fossil energy with CCS technology and renewable energy.
3Examples are the lack of adequate power storage possibilities, buffering varying wind
speeds and sun hours, or the need for distributed transmission networks (Heal, 2009).
4So far, no full scale test plants are operating. Golombek et al. (2009) review several
studies and find that the most promising types of CCS plants could be competitive at
about 30 USD (2007 value) per ton carbon dioxide.
5Barrett (2005) has a game theoretical treatment of international climate agreements,
while Røgeberg et al. (2010) offer more of a political economy approach.
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Fossil fuel suppliers optimize dynamically and sell fossils to conventional and
(in period two) CCS power generators. Those sell power competitively in the
same market as renewable energy suppliers to energy end users, who are in-
different with regards to the source of their energy. Climate policy is enacted
either in both periods (as a first best benchmark) or in the second period
only.
We find that with imperfect climate policies, cost reductions related to
CCS may be more desirable than comparable cost reductions related to re-
newable energy. The finding rests on the incentives fossil resource owners
face. With regulations of emissions only in the future, cheaper renewables
speed up extraction, whereas CCS cost reductions potentially make fossil
resources more attractive for future use and lead to postponed extraction.
1.1 Literature
The early literature on the interaction of fossil resource extraction and cli-
mate change focuses on optimal policies.6 The contributors investigate how
varying assumptions on accumulation of pollutants in the atmosphere, dam-
age functions, backstop technologies, extraction costs, etc. impact the opti-
mal tax on emissions. Both rising and falling tax paths are possible, mirroring
the net present value of future damages by emissions today. Also the tran-
sition to backstop technologies can take different shapes, dependent on cost
functions and pollution accumulation.
In a more recent work on optimal policy, Ayong Le Kama et al. (2009)
determine cost conditions under which it is optimal to use CCS as an abate-
ment technology and describe the optimal path of usage. In their model,
the sequestration rate should decrease over time. Other later contributions
relax the assumption of perfect policy and add new trade-offs: With a cap
on pollution, renewable and fossil energy may be produced simultaneously,
6Sinclair (1994); Ulph and Ulph (1994); Withagen (1994); Hoel and Kverndokk (1996);
Tahvonen (1997).
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while (constant unit cost) abatement is never used before the cap is reached,
or at the same time as renewable energy is produced (Chakravorty et al.,
2006). A constant cap on emissions may lead to substitution away from a
relatively clean to a dirty fossil fuel in early periods if these are imperfect
substitutes (Smulders and van der Werf, 2008). Food prices may be influ-
enced by the scarcity of fossil fuels and the strictness of a pollution limit
when land is scarce and used for both food and biofuel production (Chakra-
vorty et al., 2008). And with a fixed carbon tax, the presence of learning by
doing in renewable energy technologies may speed up the extraction of fossil
fuels (Chakravorty et al., 2010).
The assumption of comprehensive climate policy implemented today and
globally is hard to defend as descriptive. When climate policy is implemented
in the future only, present emissions remain unpriced.7 Long and Sinn (1985)
investigate reactions of fossil fuel owners to surprise changes in current and
expected future prices. Sinn (2008) points explicitly at role of the supply side
in climate policy. He shows that fossil fuel owners respond to taxation by
re-allocating extraction over time: If high future taxes are expected, extrac-
tion takes place earlier, and, under extreme assumptions, the total amount
extracted remains unaltered (the green paradox).
Di Maria et al. (2008) model multiple fossil resources differing in their
carbon content, finding that policy announcements may lead to more extrac-
tion of the relatively dirty resource earlier. Strand (2007) focuses on climate
friendly technologies. He demonstrates that if a technology policy today leads
to fossil fuel becoming superfluous in the future and other policies are absent,
present carbon dioxide emissions will increase. Hoel (2008) shows that such
an effect will also be observed if an incomplete climate policy is in place,
even if alternative energy technologies become only marginally cheaper. He
illustrates that it is possible for such a technological improvement to lower
7Another imperfection arises when not all judicial entities participate in a climate
agreement (carbon leakage), see Eichner and Pethig (2009); van der Werf (2009).
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social welfare.
Several authors have examined conditions under which the green paradox
arises. Gerlagh (2010) differentiates between a ‘weak’ (an increase in current
emissions) and a ‘strong’ (higher cumulative damages) green paradox. In-
creasing extraction costs counteract the strong version, while imperfect sub-
stitutes counteract both. Independently, Grafton et al. (2010) define a weak
green paradox in the same way, while they call a rise in total atmospheric
carbon dioxide a ‘strict’ green paradox. They look into effects of biofuel sub-
sidies under both linear and nonlinear demand schedules, and with constant
and rising extraction costs. They find numerically that the weak green para-
dox may arise for a wide range of specifications. Also Hoel (2010) looks at
extraction costs. In addition he investigates carbon tax expectations when
policy makers cannot commit to future tax paths. Van der Ploeg and With-
agen (2010) show that expensive but not cheap backstops cause the green
paradox to occur.
Finally, a line of research analyzes various aspects of the CCS technology
without taking the dynamics of the supply side into account, establishing
cost estimates and the optimal use of the technology in numerical models.8
2 The model
Consider owners of some fossil resource that plan for two periods of time.
The interest rate is r. There is a given total stock of the resource (F ), all of
which can be extracted at constant marginal costs, for simplicity set to zero.
In the first period, they can sell their fossil fuel to power generators that have
a conventional technology turning it into power. Again we disregard costs.
The competitive price for fossil resources in period one is p1. We define that
one unit of fossils results in one unit of conventional energy and one unit of
8See Al-Juaied and Whitmore (2009); Golombek et al. (2009); Islegen and Reichelstein
(2009); Lohwasser and Madlener (2009).
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GHG emissions (table 1). There is no natural absorption of GHGs.9 In the
Table 1: Conversion between energy, fossil fuel and emissions
technology energy fossil fuel emissions
conventional (t = 1/2) x1/x x1/x x1/x
CCS xCCS xCCS(1 + γ) 0a
renewable xRE 0 0
a In section 6 we will consider residual emissions from CCS and
replace 0 with δxCCS .
second period, the fossil fuel owners again sell to conventional power gener-
ators, and in addition also to power generators using CCS technology (call
the competitive second period fossil resource price p). CCS requires 1 + γ
units of fossils to generate one unit of energy and causes no emissions. In
addition, each unit of energy generated has a non-energy cost of c. Finally,
the conventional power generators (potentially) pay a carbon tax for emis-
sions, τ1 in period one and τ in period two. The taxes are set by a regulator
who wishes to limit the GHG emissions from the sector to an exogenously
determined cap G for period two. Note that for the cap to be meaningful,
we must require G < F .10
The power producers convert fossils to energy and supply it to the energy
market. It follows from above that they do so at constant marginal costs:
p1+τ1 for conventional in period one, p+τ for conventional in period two and
p(1 + γ) + c for CCS. The latter two need to be equal for conventional and
CCS producers to produce at the same time. Call the competitive energy
prices (to consumers) P1 and P for periods one and two. In addition to
conventional and CCS energy, also renewable energy is supplied competitively
9Thus we focus on the share of GHGs that can be regarded as remaining in the atmo-
sphere indefinitely, see Socolow and Lam (2007).
10The inequality G < F implies that if CCS was not available in period 2, the resource
would not be scarce. In this case the resource rent would be zero in both periods, and
consumer prices would be equal to carbon taxes.
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in the second period. We assume that the costs of renewables are location
dependent, leading to increasing marginal costs. We get a standard supply
function S˜(P, b). Here b is a shift parameter, and to simplify we assume
S˜(P, b) = S(P − b). Demand for energy by end users in period one and two
is denoted D˜1(P1) and D(P ) respectively, and these have standard properties.
We assume that functional forms, parameters and the constraints G and
F have properties that imply an interior solution, so all types of energy are
supplied in the second period. The model can then be solved as follows. In
the energy market, price in each period is equal to the marginal costs for all
energy producers. They make zero profits and are hence indifferent to how
much to produce. The energy market equilibrium conditions are
x1 = D˜1(P1) (1)
x+ xCCS + xRE = D(P ) (2)
where x1 is conventional energy in period one and x, x
CCS and xRE are the
quantities of conventional, CCS and renewable energy in period two. For a
given market price, the supply function for renewables determines xRE
xRE = S(P − b) (3)
We can then write x+ xCCS = D(P )− S(P − b). For energy prices we have
P1 = p1 + τ1 (4)
P = p+ τ (5)
P = p(1 + γ) + c (6)
This describes the energy market. Turning to to the market for fossil
fuels, we use the conversion factors (table 1). Fossil fuel owners anticipate
the energy market behavior, thus facing a derived demand for fossils in each
9
period. Their dynamic optimization leads to the Hotelling rule
p = p1(1 + r) (7)
As they have no costs of extraction, it is also straightforward to conclude
that they want to extract all of F , implying that
x1 + x+ x
CCS(1 + γ) = F (8)
Only conventional power causes emissions, which are limited to G, so
x1 + x = G (9)
Note that the quantity of CCS fossil fuel use is determined by the exogenous
assumptions in the model: CCS use is the only way to avoid exceeding G, so
xCCS(1 + γ) = F −G.11
To have an identified system of equations, we need an additional assump-
tion on the carbon taxes τ1 and τ . We explore two different scenarios. First,
we assume that taxation is socially cost efficient. As only GHGs in the at-
mosphere in period two are of concern and they accumulate linearly, optimal
taxation requires τ = τ1(1 + r). Second, climate policy being in place in
period two only translates into setting τ1 = 0. Either assumption allows
11This is unnecesarily rigid. In section 6 we will however show that the effect we are
interested in does not rest on this simplification.
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solving the system, which after some simplifications reduces to
F + γG = (1 + γ)
[
D˜1
(
p
1 + r
+ τ1
)
+D(P )− S(P − b)
]
(10)
P = p+ τ (11)
P = p(1 + γ) + c (12)
τ1 = 0 (13)
τ = τ1(1 + r) (14)
We have two sets of four equations in four unknowns (P, p, τ1, τ).
3 A perfect world – taxation in both periods
Assume the GHG constraint is implemented by a intertemporally cost effi-
cient taxation scheme, i.e. τ = τ1(1+r). So τ represents carbon taxes in both
periods. Demand in period one can then be written as D˜1 ([p+ τ ](1 + r)
−1) =
D1(p+τ) = D1(P ). End users face the same energy price in net present value
terms in both periods. The model from section 2 can be reduced to
F + γG = (1 + γ) [D1(P ) +D(P )− S(P − b)] (15)
p =
P − c
1 + γ
(16)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ
(17)
What happens to prices and the emission profile if one of the technology/cost
parameters c, b or γ is reduced (and this is correctly anticipated)? First note
that (15) implies that lower non-energy CCS costs c have no effect on the
energy price P , even though it is now cheaper to abate. Looking at p and τ
(‘breaking up’ P ) helps with the intuition. Knowing that dP
dc
= 0, one sees
11
from (16) and (17) that
dp
dc
= − 1
1 + γ
(18)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(19)
The reason is that even though CCS energy is now cheaper, the amount
optimally used is unaffected: it is given by the limit on GHGs, the available
resource and the technology. But if the amount of CCS energy produced
remains unchanged, no adjustments in allocation are desirable and the energy
price is the same as before. What happens though is that limiting GHGs gets
cheaper and fossil fuel resources become more valuable. Taxes go down and
fossil fuel prices increase by the same amount. Some of the economic surplus
shifts from the regulator to the fossil fuel owners.12
Turning next to the energy cost of CCS γ, the effect on P is obtained
from (15). The reactions by p and τ are then retrieved from (16) and (17).
Recall that G = x1 + x, D1 = x1 and D − S = x+ xCCS. We get
dP
dγ
=
G+ S −D1 −D
(1 + γ)[D′1 +D′ − S ′]
=
−xCCS
(1 + γ)[D′1 +D′ − S ′]
> 0 (20)
dp
dγ
=
1
1 + γ
dP
dγ
− P − c
(1 + γ)2
(21)
dτ
dγ
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
dγ
+
P − c
(1 + γ)2
> 0 (22)
A decrease in the extra energy required for CCS lowers energy prices, has an
ambiguous impact on fossil fuel prices and decreases the carbon tax.
The price of energy for both periods (P ) has to go down. Less energy is
12Intuitively: Cheaper CCS at a given P ceteris paribus makes CCS energy producers
want to supply infinitely much. They demand more fossils and p must go up until they
are indifferent again. At the new p and the given τ , conventional producers would not
produce in period two. The GHG constraint would be underutilized. The change in τ
exactly offsets the rise in p.
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needed for CCS to reduce GHGs, so more is available to end users. Extrac-
tion is in response shifted forward in time. The tax has to be lowered too.
Preventing GHG emission has become cheaper, so a lesser opportunity cost
is needed. The effect on fuel price is indeterminate. More CCS energy is sup-
plied from the same amount of fossil fuels, lowering demand for fossils. But
the fall in energy price means less renewable energy is supplied, increasing
demand. After some manipulations of (21) one gets the following condition
(recall that F −G = xCCS(1 + γ))
dp
dγ
> 0 ⇔ F −G > (1 + γ)(P − c)[S ′ −D′1 −D′] (23)
Large carbon reserves in the ground (F ) work in favor of a dropping fuel price,
and so does a strict limit on carbon emissions (G). On the contrary, high CCS
energy costs, a high equilibrium fossil fuel price (recall that P−c = (1+γ)p),
steep demand curves and a steep supply curve for renewables pull in the
direction of a rising fuel price as the energy cost (γ) declines.
What are the distributional consequences? Consumer surplus increases,
the regulator’s revenues decrease while the effect on the Hotelling rent is
ambiguous. Owners of renewable power production lose some Ricardian rent.
Finally, for a shift in the cost curve of renewables we get
dP
db
= − S
′
D′1 +D′ − S ′
∈ (0, 1) (24)
dp
db
=
1
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
1
1 + γ
)
(25)
dτ
db
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
γ
1 + γ
)
(26)
P is again reduced, and also p and τ go down. A source of energy becoming
cheaper leads to a falling energy price. As it is a substitute for fossil energy,
the derived value of the fossil resource is decreased. And the tax is reduced
to make sure that the resulting fall in opportunity costs is reflected. Some
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of the fossil fuel is re-allocated to the first period (D′1(P ) < 0). Hotelling
rent and regulator revenues are decreased, while consumer surplus and the
Ricardian rent for owners of renewable power go up.
Summing up, all adjustments in response to technological changes in the
current section are socially cost efficient. Taxation in both periods allows
policy makers to price emissions correctly. Table 2 summarizes the results.
Table 2: Impacts of changes in cost parameters on prices, taxes and emissions
in period one under taxation in both periods
lower c lower γ lower b
(CCS non-energy) (CCS energy) (renewable)
P
0 − −
(energy)
p
+ ? −
(resource)
τ − − −
(tax)
x1
0 + +
(early emissions)
All improvements lower the carbon tax path: it becomes cheaper for society
to ‘solve’ the climate problem. For renewables and CCS energy costs, the
consumers benefit from lower energy prices in both periods. One major
difference is how the fossil fuel price is affected by changes in non-energy
costs of CCS and more efficient renewables: the former makes a complement
to fossil resources in energy production cheaper, the latter a substitute. Total
emissions are given exogenously by G. But emissions are accelerated by a
lower γ or b and left unchanged by a reduction in c. Some economic rent is
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shifted from the government (the taxation revenue falls) to resource owners
(the Hotelling rent rises) when c is reduced. A lower γ increases consumer
surplus, decreases tax revenues and has no conclusive effect on fossil fuel
owners. Renewable energy producers lose some Ricardian rent due to the
lower energy price. A cut in costs of renewables finally benefits the owners
of renewables and the consumers while it reduces the Hotelling rent and the
regulator revenues.
4 Plan B – fixing it tomorrow
Now suppose a carbon tax is imposed only in the second period, i.e. τ1 = 0.
This represents a scenario where in the medium term the major emitting
countries agree upon a target level for GHG concentrations. Demand in
period one can be written as D˜1(p(1 + r)
−1) = D1(p). Note that p is now
both: the resource price (for both periods due to the Hotelling rule) and the
energy price in period one.13 P is the energy price for period two only.
By using D1(p) in (10) and replacing p (from 12), the equilibrium condi-
tions can now be reduced to
F + γG = (1 + γ)
[
D1
(
P − c
1 + γ
)
+D(P )− S(P − b)
]
(27)
p =
P − c
1 + γ
(28)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ
(29)
What do market and policy reactions to technological changes look like
13More precisely, the energy price in the first period is p(1 + r)−1.
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now? Implicit derivation of (27) and using (28) and (29) yields
dP
dc
=
D′1
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D′ − S ′]
∈ (0, 1) (30)
dp
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(
dP
dc
− 1
)
∈
( −1
1 + γ
, 0
)
(31)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ
(
γ
dP
dc
+ 1
)
∈
(
1
1 + γ
, 1
)
(32)
First, a lower c now decreases second period energy price P . Given standard
supply and demand function properties the fraction is positive. Intuitively:
the amount of CCS used remains the same.14 To keep conventional energy
competitive in period two, the regulator must lower the tax. This makes
fossil fuel sales in period two more attractive, fuel prices (and hence energy
prices in period one) rise and extraction is postponed.15
Secondly, changes in the energy requirement of CCS plants (γ) lead to
dP
dγ
=
G+ S −D1 −D +D′1 · (P−c)1+γ
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D′ − S ′]
=
−xCCS +D′1 · (P−c)1+γ
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D′ − S ′]
> 0 (33)
dp
dγ
=
1
1 + γ
dP
dγ
− P − c
(1 + γ)2
(34)
dτ
dγ
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
dγ
+
P − c
(1 + γ)2
> 0 (35)
The cost drop for CCS energy requires that the regulator adjusts the tax
downward. The energy price in period two must thus fall, and renewable
supplies decrease. Both effects make fossil fuel sales in period two more
attractive. But as more energy is derived from the constant amount of fossil
fuel used for CCS energy, residual demand drops. Thus the final effect on
fossil fuel prices is indeterminate. Manipulating (34) yields a condition for
14The GHG cap G, the resource stock F and the conversion factor γ are unchanged.
15Also, more fossil energy supply in period two decreases P and lowers supplies of
renewables.
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lower energy costs of CCS leading to a drop in fossil fuel price, which is very
similar to the one derived in section 3
dp
dγ
> 0 ⇔ F −G > (1 + γ)(P − c)(S ′ −D′) (36)
Finally, a change in the cost of renewable energy b gives the following
changes
dP
db
= − (1 + γ)S
′
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D′ − S ′]
∈ (0, 1) (37)
dp
db
=
1
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
1
1 + γ
)
(38)
dτ
db
=
γ
1 + γ
dP
db
∈
(
0,
γ
1 + γ
)
(39)
The expressions are formally almost identical to those in section 3,16 but
mind the difference in interpretation. A cut in b increases supply of renewable
energy. P drops. For fossil based energy to be sold in period two, p must go
down. The reduction is worth γ more to CCS than to conventional power
producers, so τ must be reduced too. As p is also the energy price in period
one, more fossils are allocated to the first period.
In summary, the policy instrument in this scenario is incomplete: Conven-
tional power producers in period one pay a zero carbon tax. Hence from the
outset more of the fossil resource than socially optimal is extracted in the
first period. Table 3 summarizes the results. All improvements again lower
the tax and the second period energy price as it becomes cheaper to solve the
climate problem. Of most interest is the difference in cost cuts in non-energy
costs of CCS c and renewables b on the extraction profile: a smaller c shifts
extraction to the second period, while lower b does the opposite.
16The denominator is by γD′1 smaller.
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Table 3: Impacts of changes in cost parameters on prices, tax and emissions
in period one under taxation in period two only
lower c lower γ lower b
(CCS non-energy) (CCS energy) (renewable)
P − − −
(price t = 2)
p
+ ? −
(price t = 1)
τ − − −
(tax)
x1 − ? +
(emissions t = 1)
5 Welfare effects of technological changes
In our model, earlier extraction is not worse per se.17 Is it still possible
(and likely) that a reduction in c is preferable to a reduction in b due to the
intertemporal inefficiency? Yes, provided that the comparison is between
parameter changes that give the same total cost reductions. To see this,
consider first the welfare effects of an incremental change ∆c in the cost of
CCS. The total effect on social welfare W (discounted to period 1) is18
∆W = − (1 + r)−1 xCCS∆c+ P1∆x1 + (1 + r)−1 P∆x (40)
17Hoel (2008) shows that in such a case a lower b may lower welfare.
18W =
∫ x1
0
P1(y)dy + (1 + r)−1
(∫ x+xCCS+xRE
0
P (y)dy − cxCCS −K(xRE)
)
, where
K(xRE) = bxRE + g(xRE) are the costs of renewable energy, and P (y), P1(y) are the
inverse demand functions. Taking the differential and noting that P = K ′ yields the
following results.
18
The first term is the direct cost effect. Initial social CCS costs are cxCCS. The
second and third term give the welfare effects of changes in conventional fuel
use in period one and two. The changes in these quantities are multiplied
by the consumer prices, i.e. the marginal utilities. Changes in the two
other energy sources in period two are not included. For renewable energy,
consumer price minus marginal costs is equal to zero. CCS energy use does
not change with changes in c (∆xCCS = 0).
Since ∆x = −∆x1 (from x1 + x = G), we may rewrite this expression as
∆W = − (1 + r)−1 xCCS∆c+ [P1 − (1 + r)−1 P ]∆x1 (41)
In the social optimum (section 3) the term in square brackets is zero, so
the total welfare effect consists only of the direct effect −(1 + r)−1xCCS∆c.
However, when there is no carbon tax in the first period, the model in section
2 implies19 that the term in square brackets equals (1 + r)−1 (−τ), giving
∆W = − (1 + r)−1 xCCS∆c− (1 + r)−1 τ∆x1 (42)
or
∆W = (−∆c) (1 + r)−1
[
xCCS + τ
∆x1
∆c
]
(43)
We know that a reduction in c decreases extraction in period 1, i.e. ∆x1
∆c
> 0.
The second term in square brackets thus adds to the direct positive effect on
welfare of reduced costs.
Proceeding in exactly the same way with a change in b, we find
∆W = (−∆b) (1 + r)−1
[
xRE + τ
∆x1
∆b
]
(44)
We know that a reduction in b increases extraction in period one, i.e. ∆x1
∆b
< 0.
19Recall that P1 = p1, p = p1(1 + r) and P = p+ τ .
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The second term in square brackets thus reduces the direct positive effect on
welfare of reduced costs. For decreases in c and b that give the same total
cost reductions, i.e. ∆cxCCS = ∆bxRE, it follows that reduced costs of CCS
increase welfare more than reduced costs of renewables.
Notice also that the term
[
xRE + τ ∆x1
∆b
]
, and thus ∆W , can be negative if
xRE is sufficiently small and S ′(C ′(xRE)− b) ≥ s¯ > 0 for all xRE ≥ 0 (where
C ′ − b is the marginal cost of renewables). To see this, rewrite ∆x1
∆b
∆x1
∆b
=
1
∆b
1
D′1
∆p =
1
∆b
1
D′1
dp
db
∆b
which after inserting from (38) gives
∆x1
∆b
=
1
−D′1
S ′
D′1 + (1 + γ)[D′ − S ′]
The term ∆x1
∆b
will have an upward bound that is below zero provided that
S ′(C ′(xRE)− b) ≥ s¯ > 0 for all xRE ≥ 0. For sufficiently small values of xRE
the term
[
xRE + τ ∆x1
∆b
]
must therefore be negative (for τ > 0), implying that
social welfare declines as a response to reduced costs of renewable energy.
The intuition is that for a sufficiently low initial value of renewable energy,
the direct effect of the reduced cost is so small that it is dominated by the
indirect negative welfare effect of reallocating extraction from the future to
the present.
6 Extensions
The model used so far is quite rigid. It has been assumed that: (1) There
are no residual emissions from CCS power stations. (2) There is a fixed
amount of fossil fuel resources available, all of which can be extracted at the
same constant unit cost (set to zero). (3) The level of GHG concentration
is exogenous and the timing of emissions is irrelevant. We now relax all of
20
these assumptions for the case of taxation in period two only. We show that
the difference between improvements in renewables and CCS persists.
6.1 Residual emissions from CCS
At present, CCS is expected to remove 90 per cent of carbon dioxide emis-
sions. About ten per cent would still reach the atmosphere (IPCC, 2005). In
the model, let producing one unit of CCS energy cause δ units of emissions
(δ ∈ (0, 1)).20 Two changes occur. CCS energy producers now pay τδ in
carbon tax per unit of energy, and the GHG cap changes to
x1 + x+ δx
CCS = G (49)
The amount of CCS used is now
xCCS =
F −G
1 + γ − δ (50)
As emissions from CCS decrease, the total amount of CCS energy does too
while the amount of avoided emissions from CCS is constant by assumption.
6.2 Extraction costs
Assume that the extraction costs are independent of the extraction rate, but
increase with accumulated extraction. The original model in section 2 treated
the limiting case, where we assumed constant (zero) unit cost of extraction
combined with an absolute upper limit on accumulated extraction. Total
extraction F becomes endogenous.21
Formally, we let each unit of the resource be indexed by a continuous
variable z, and let a(z) be the cost of extracting unit z, with a′ ≥ 0. In the
20Per unit of fossil fuel burned δˆ emissions are caused, so that δ = δˆ(1 + γ).
21This is a specification frequently used in the resource literature, see e.g. Heal (1976)
and Hanson (1980).
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two-period model x1 is extraction in period one and x+x
CCS(1+γ) = F−x1
is extraction in period two. The cost of extracting x1 is thus given by
A(x1) =
∫ x1
0
a(z)dz, and cost of extracting F−x1 is
∫ F
x1
a(z)dz =
∫ F
0
a(z)dz−∫ x1
0
a(z)dz = A(F ) − A(x1). Notice that these relationships imply that
A′(x1) = a(x1) and A′(F ) = a(F ). The limiting case of a constant unit cost
a of extraction up to an exogenous limit F¯ would imply that A(x1) = ax1
and A(F )− a(x1) = a · (F − x1) (up to F¯ ).
We now simplify and assume that extraction costs are zero for all extrac-
tion up to a level f which is larger than the equilibrium extraction in period
one, so that A(x1) = 0 for all relevant values of x1 in period one. Moreover,
let extraction costs a(F ) be positive and rising for extraction levels above f ,
so that costs in period two are A(F ) which is rising for F > f and strictly
convex.
With these assumptions the simple Hotelling rule remains valid, so that
the resource price in period one is (1 + r)−1p, as before. In the second
period, the amount extracted will be determined by A′(F ) = p, giving F
as an increasing function of p: F = F (p) with F ′ > 0. The case treated
previously was the limiting case of F ′ = 0.
6.3 Climate costs
Instead of the limit on GHGs G being exogenous, we now let it be determined
endogenously. Clearly, total emissions G are important for the climate costs.
According to Allen et al. (2009), the peak temperature increase is approxi-
mately insensitive to the timing of emissions. However, we would expect this
peak temperature increase to occur earlier the more of the emissions occur at
an early stage. It also seems reasonable to expect climate costs to be higher
the more rapidly the temperature increases, for a given peak temperature
increase. Within our model, it thus seems reasonable to assume that climate
costs are increasing in the two variables (G, x1). To make our derivations
slightly simpler without changing anything of substance, we assume that the
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function the climate cost function is given by E(G + σx1), where E
′ and σ
are positive.
The optimal (Pigovian) carbon tax in period two is
τ = E ′(G+ σx1) (51)
giving G as
G = E ′(−1)(τ)− σx1 = Λ(τ)− σx1 (52)
If there is no carbon tax in period one, we simply have x1 = D1(p).
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6.4 The extended model
With residual emissions, extraction- and climate costs, the model now is
described by
[1− δ]F
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ γΛ
(
γP + c
1 + γ − δ
)
= (1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ)D1
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ (1 + γ − δ) [D(P )− S(P − b)]
(53)
p =
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ (54)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ − δ (55)
In the appendix we show that the main results obtained from the original,
simplified model are robust to the extensions discussed here. The qualitative
effects of changes in b on prices and carbon tax remain the same (see table
4). An important addition is that the reduced resource price leads to less
22If taxes are set optimally also in period one, x1 will depend on this tax. If σ = 0 as
before τ1 = (1 + r)−1τ . However, if σ > 0, the optimal tax in period one will be higher.
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cumulative extraction (F goes down). Total emissions and climate damage
also decrease (G and E down). The effects of a decline in c on second period
energy price P are indeterminate in the extended model. The first period
energy price p however rises. This means that the shift in extraction towards
the second period still takes place: less is extracted in period one. In addition,
more is extracted in total. As the carbon tax also goes down, the climate
damage decreases (while total emissions are indeterminate).
Table 4: Impacts of changes in cost parameters on prices (p, P ), tax (τ), early
emissions (x1), fossil fuel extraction (F ), total emissions (G) and climate
damage (E) in the extended model under taxation in period two only
lower c lower b
(CCS non-energy) (renewable)
P
? −
(price t = 2)
p
+ −
(price t = 1)
τ − −
(tax)
x1 − +
(emissions t = 1)
F
+ −
(extraction)
G
? −
(total emissions)
E − −
(climate damage)
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7 Concluding remarks
We set out to analyze how an improvement in CCS technology influences
energy and fossil fuel prices and the timing of GHG emissions, and how it
compares to a downwards shift in renewable energy costs. We used a simple
two period model that links a market for some stylized fossil fuel to a market
for energy. One robust result is that all types of technological improvement
give a lower optimal carbon tax in period two. Other effects of technological
improvements depend both on the type of technological improvement and on
whether climate policy is optimally designed in both periods or only in period
two. Key results are summarized in tables 2 to 4. One important conclusion
is that if there is no carbon tax in period one, lower non-energy costs for CCS
have the opposite effect on period one emissions of lower costs of renewable
energy. This is an important difference, as emissions are too high in period
one when there is no carbon tax in this period. We showed that the increase
in period one emissions resulting from reduced costs of renewable energy
might even lead to lower social welfare. A lower non-energy cost of CCS will
decrease period one emissions, and therefore always increase social welfare.
As for policy implications, under specific circumstances supporting the de-
velopment of CCS is preferable from supporting renewables. What are these
circumstances? One has to believe that a future climate policy will come into
being. Second, fossil fuel producers’ ability to reallocate production needs to
be large enough for the effect to matter. Also, both technologies are assumed
to be available on sufficient scale at the same time. If renewables are ready
earlier (or later), the picture changes. And if one believes that climate policy
will not even be implemented in the future, supporting renewables may be
preferable for another reason: they at least potentially can compete with
conventional energy, while CCS will always impose an additional cost.
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A Appendix: solving the extended model
We focus on the effects of reducing the CCS non-energy costs c and the costs
of renewables b. Again, with the changes from section (6) the model is
[1− δ]F
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ γΛ
(
γP + c
1 + γ − δ
)
= (1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ)D1
(
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ
)
+ (1 + γ − δ) [D(P )− S(P − b)]
(A.1)
p =
(1− δ)P − c
1 + γ − δ (A.2)
τ =
γP + c
1 + γ − δ (A.3)
Implicit differentiation of (A.1) with respect to b gives
dP
db
=
−(1 + γ − δ)2S′
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′
(A.4)
The expression is positive (note that Λ′ > 0 and F ′ > 0) and bounded above
by one. This mirrors the results in the original model. Likewise do the
effects on p and τ which can be obtained by inserting (A.1) in differentials
of equations (A.2) and (A.3) respectively. Again the first period energy
(and resource) price p goes down in response to a reduction of the costs of
renewables, and so does the tax τ . Differentiating with respect to c we get
dP
dc
=
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ]D′1 − (1− δ)F ′ + γΛ′
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′
(A.5)
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The effect on the second period price is ambiguous as the numerator contains
negative as well as positive terms. It is positive if
(1− δ)F ′ − [1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ]D′1 > γΛ′ (A.6)
In comparison, in the original model the effect was always positive. We
observe that the ambiguity stems from the endogenization of the GHG cap
G (in the original model we had Λ′ = 0). Introducing extraction costs of the
form A(F ) in period two does not change the qualitative results from the
original model. The change in p can again be calculated from (A.2)
dp
dc
=
1
1 + γ − δ
[
(1− δ)dP
dc
− 1
]
(A.7)
The effect is negative: If (A.5) is negative, it follows immediately. If (A.5)
is positive, it needs to be true that (1 − δ)dP
dc
< 1 for the effect to still be
negative, so we require that
[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 − (1− δ)2F ′ + (1− δ)γΛ′
> [1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 + (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′]− (1− δ)2F ′ − γ2Λ′
(A.8)
Simplifying
[(1− δ)γ + γ2]Λ′ > (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′] (A.9)
The last equation is always true. So the first period energy price rises in
response to a fall in non-energy costs of CCS. Thus the main finding of the
original model is robust towards the discussed generalizations.
In addition, it follows from F ′(p) > 0 that the total amount of fossil
resources extracted falls with lower costs of renewables and rises in response
to cheaper CCS.
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The effect on the carbon tax τ is (from A.3)
dτ
dc
=
1
1 + γ − δ
(
γ
dP
dc
+ 1
)
(A.10)
We see that if γ dP
dc
> −1, then like in the original model the tax decreases in
response to lower non-energy costs of CCS. Inserting and rearranging
γ(1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ)D′1 − γ(1− δ)F ′
< −[1 + γ(1 + σ)− δ](1− δ)D′1 − (1 + γ − δ)2 [D′ − S ′] + (1− δ)2F ′
(A.11)
(A.11) shows that the inequality always holds. The LHS contains only neg-
ative terms, the RHS only positive ones. In line with the original model, the
tax decreases in response to lower non-energy costs of CCS.
We can now also ask how the GHG stock in the atmosphere the climate
costs are affected. The model produces reasonable effects: (52) states
G = Λ(τ)− σD1(p)
We assume σ > 0. A reduction in b hence decreases G (both p and τ fall),
while a reduction in c has an ambigious effect (due to p rising). Less early
emissions decrease the additional harm they cause (as expressed by σ > 0),
hence opening up for increased total emissions. The effect on climate costs
can be read out of its definition (equation 51)
τ = E ′(G+ σx1)
As τ falls in response to a lower b or c, so must E ′. Since E is increasing and
strictly convex, a lower derivative indicates lower total climate costs.
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